Convergence an d divergence in dual systems theories
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29092/uacm.v9i19.403Keywords:
Dual theory, reasoning, rationality, cognitive psychology, normativityAbstract
Different dual system theories in cognitive psychology share some theses which make their defenders to look themselves as supporters of the same theoretical project. The purpose of this article is to highlight in which sense these theories converge and in which they do not. In this article I endorse that different dual system theories share descriptive theses, nevertheless they disagree about the normative standards that must be used to evaluate human reasoning. At the end of the article I argue that the discussion of rationality is central to dual systems theories, and I suggest that this discussion could be enriched by philosophical analysis.
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