The methodological distinction between theoretical language and observational language: an epistemological analysis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29092/uacm.v13i31.426Keywords:
Scientific realism, empirical constructivism, theoretical language, observational language, observable entities, unobservable entitiesAbstract
In this paper I analyze the main arguments and counterarguments proposed by realists and anti-realists stances for and against the scientific ability to produce objective and true scientific knowledge about the social and natural world. I argue that the theoretical and observational language which social and natural scientists use to refer to several scientific observable and unobservable entities, phenomena, properties and processes are determined, in practice, by their theoretical research traditions. This shows that scientific methodology depends so heavily on scientific theories that is, at most, a constructive procedure and not a discovery procedure.
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